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Comments
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
AMENDMENTS OF 1970: A STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal government has traditionally assumed primary responsibility for enforcing federal commerce clause legislation.' Four recent court
of appeals cases, however, involved an apparent deviation from this custom:
federal authorities sought to delegate enforcement responsibility for commerce legislation to the states. The courts examined whether the Clean
Air Amendments of 19702 authorized the EPA Administrator to compel
states to adopt and enforce federal regulations as local law and, if so,
1. Although the federal government has assumed responsibility for the implementation of its own commerce legislation, there have been numerous attempts to
enlist state aid. The provision of federal funds has been conditioned upon state compliance with federal standards. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937). Occasionally, the federal government has openly solicited the states' voluntary participation in an enforcement program. The most typical approach to obtaining
state cooperation, however, has been through the threat of direct federal enforcement

or the promise of federal funds. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F2d 215, 228 (4th Cir.
1975). See also Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L.
Rxv. 489, 515-16 (1954).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
The history of air pollution legislation abounds with references to both
economic and social policies reflecting the propriety of cleaning the air under the
ambit of the commerce clause. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., A STUDY OF POLLUTION - A STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE (Comm. Print 1963). Prior to the amendments, Congress had recognized the interstate effects of air pollution, noting its
adverse economic effects on crops as well as its harmful effects on humans. Id. at v
(preface by Senator Muskie), 14-15, 18. These observations produced legislation
in 1963 and 1967. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392; Act of Nov.
21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. By 1970, the economic effects of air pollution were obvious. Consequently, comments on the adverse effects of pollution emphasized justifications for specific portions of the 1970 act. See H.R. REP. No. 1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (discussion of the potential economic advantages to
states with lax standards for factory emissions); 116 CONG. REc. 42390 (1970)
(letter of November, 1970 from HEW Secretary Elliott Richardson to Congress
urging the retention of preemptive federal emission standards for new motor vehicles
and noting the practical difficulties in the production and sale of motor vehicles if
each state were free to establish standards more stringent than the federal minimum).

(586)
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whether the commerce clause could support such legislation. 8 Subsequent to the four circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court decided
National League of Cities v. Usery,4 which restricted the scope of federal
commerce legislation that unduly hampers the operation of state governments. This Comment will discuss whether the statutory scheme of the
Clean Air Amendments allows the EPA to make such extraordinary
demands upon the states. On the assumption that the statute can be so
interpreted, this Comment will then consider whether such legislation is
a proper exercise of the commerce power in light of the recent decision in
National League of Cities.
II.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAN

A.

AIR

AMENDMENTS OF

1970

The Statutory Structure

By 1970, the pockets of air pollution enveloping major American
cities had become a significant health hazard. 5 In an effort to improve air
quality control Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments. Although
a portion of the amendments provided standards for the reduction of
pollution from stationary sources,6 the new emission standards were concerned mainly with the automobile, not the industrial plant.7 The amendments set forth a tripartite scheme for the development of anti-pollution
programs. Initially, the EPA Administrator would issue national air
quality standards designed to reduce the level of atmospheric pollutants.8
Each state was then expected to formulate an implementation plan to meet
3. The four cases were: Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted,96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976) ; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F2d 971 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976) ; Brown v. EPA, 521 F2d 827 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d
Cir. 1974). For a general discussion of these four cases and the 1970 amendments, see
Comment, The Federal Enforcement Provisions of the 1970 Amendments to the Clean
Air Act: Statutory Scope and Constitutionality, 1976 B.Y.U.L. Rav. 189 [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Enforcement Provisions].
4. 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). In November of 1969, a severe inversion in Chicago increased by three times
the number of deaths normally attributable to tracheal bronchitis. Id. at 465.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5. For a discussion of the relationship between stationary
sources of pollution, which are nonmobile sources such as factories, and land use
controls, see Note, EPA Regulation of "Indirect Sources": A Skeptical View, 12
HAmv. J. LEx~ts. 111, 119-22 (1974).
7. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); H.R. RaP. No. 1146,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). National air quality standards have been issued
for such pollutants as sulphur oxides, hydrocarbons and photochemical oxidants. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1974).
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these standards. 9 The Administrator was to approve a state implementation plan if it conformed to certain minimum requirements. 10 Pursuant
to these requirements, the plan was to include provisions for: meeting
standards within three years;" establishing emission limitations and a
monitoring system;12 providing necessary assurances of adequate state
personnel, funding and authority ;13 and providing for periodic inspection
and testing of motor vehicles to ensure compliance. 1 4 If the Administrator
determined that a state plan did not conform to these minimum requirements he was to promulgate a new plan for the state. 15
The promulgation provision provides in part:
The Administrator shall . . . promptly prepare and publish . . .
an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if . . . the

plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is determined
by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements
of this section .... 16

When the Administrator promulgated a plan it would then become the
applicable implementation plan for the state. 17 An applicable implementation plan operates against all "persons," a term defined to include states
as well as individuals and corporations.' 8
The enforcement provision empowers the Administrator to seek sanctions for single violations.
Whenever . . . any person is in violation of any requirement of

an applicable implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the
person in violation of the plan and the State in which the plan
applies .

. .

. [After 30 days] the Administrator may issue an order

requiring such person to comply with the requirements of such plan
or he may bring a civil action .... 19
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c). Examples of transportation controls within such
implementation plans would include parking restrictions, exclusive bus lanes, gasoline
sales limitations and state inspection programs. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(r) (1973).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (1970).

11. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (C) (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (F) (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (a) (2) (G) (1970).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970). This provision of the 1970 amendments significantly revises the promulgatory power of federal authorities. The 1967 Air Quality
Act limited federal promulgations to the issuance of air quality standards and made
no reference to state implementation plans. Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148,
§ 108(c)(l)-(2), 81 Stat. 492. This change in the language of the amendments
clearly demonstrates the desire of Congress to guarantee that each state have an
operating implementation plan.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(d) (1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (1) (1970).

19771

CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS

In the event of widespread violations, the same section provides for federal
assumption of enforcement responsibility.
Whenever . . . [these] violations of an applicable implementation
plan ... appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan

applies to enforce the plan effectively, [the Administrator] shall so notify the State. If the Achninistrator finds such failure extends beyond
the 30th day after such notice, he shall give public notice of such
finding. During the period beginning with such public notice and
ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce
such plan (hereafter referred to in this section as "period of federally
assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce any requirement of such plan with respect to any person . ... 20
The statutory scheme thus relies on federal authority to ensure that the
clean air objectives are realized. If a state fails to adopt an effective plan
or neglects to enforce an applicable implementation plan, the statute empowers the Administrator to cure the resultant deficiencies. Because states
are considered persons under the enforcement provisions of the Act, the
Administrator can control emissions from state vehicles. The Act fails,
however, to specify whether the status of states as persons also allows
the Administrator to remedy deficiencies by regulating states as governmental entities. This question of the capacity in which states might be
regulated became the primary issue in the litigation over the content and
validity of the EPA regulations. The Administrator contended that states
might be regulated as persons regardless of the nature of the state function. In contrast, the states urged that they might be regulated as persons
only when their actions parallel the conduct of individuals and corporations.
B.

The Genesis of the Litigation: The Promulgation of Plans
for Pennsylvania, The National Capital Region,
California and Maryland

Following the issuance of national air quality standards in 1971,21
the states were expected to develop implementation plans. The Administrator rejected portions of the plans submitted by Pennsylvania, 22 Cali20. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a) (2) (1970). Both the single and widespread violations sections of the enforcement provision demonstrate a marked departure from
enforcement procedures under the Air Quality Act of 1967. Under the 1967 legislation, federal authorities could bring actions for the abatement of pollution in a single
state. But federal enforcement action was conditioned on the consent of the governor
of that state. Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c) (4), 81 Stat. 493.
21. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971).
22. The Administrator found Pennsylvania's plan deficient in several respects.
It failed to provide for the reduction of nitrogen oxides and for proper air quality
surveillance. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.2027, 52.2029 (1973). Further, it failed to guarantee the
purchase of necessary emission recording equipment and the availability of manpower and resources. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.2030, 52.2031 (1973). Nor did the plan provide
for the interstate dissemination of information concerning various levels of pollution
in Pennsylvania. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2032 (1973).
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25

fornia, Maryland, 24 and the National Capital Region, 25 but refused to
promulgate plans for these areas.26 He deferred action in California until
national air quality standards could be met,2 7 and granted Pennsylvania,
Maryland and the National Capital Region a two year grace period in
which to meet the air quality standards. 28 But a court ruling in 1973
held that such extensions were impermissible under the terms of the
Clean Air Act and ordered the Administrator to proceed immediately
with the evaluation of the plans submitted by the states. 29 These plans
23. The Administrator objected to California's submitted plan because it failed

to list local agency resources for air pollution control, 40 C.F.R. § 52.235 (1973), and

made no effort to ensure California's conformity with national air quality standards.
40 C.F.R. § 52.22(a) (1973). The Administrator noted in particular that California's
Emergency Services Act did not provide for air pollution emergencies. 40 C.F.R.

§ 52.225 (1973).
24. Maryland's proposed plan was criticized because: it contained no guarantee
that the state legislature would enact federal promulgations, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1074
(1973) ; it failed to use existing technology to solve the problem of nitrogen emissions
in the Baltimore area, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1075 (1973) ; it did not provide for stationary
pollution source testing in the Baltimore area, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1077 (1973) ; it failed
to use emissions data efficiently in Baltimore, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1081 (1973) ; and its
listing of Maryland's present and projected resources was inadequate, 40 C.F.R. §
52.1083 (1973).
25. The National Capital Region is composed of the District of Columbia;
Montgomery and Prince George's Counties in Maryland; Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon
and Prince William Counties in Virginia. The Administrator objected to the National
Capital Region plan because the District of Columbia and surrounding communities
failed to guarantee that their legislative bodies would make the necessary commitments to the execution of the implementation plans. 38 Fed. Reg. 16556-57 (D.C.),
16558-59 (Md.), 16563 (Va.) (1973).
26. The Administrator required the states to draft and submit their plans again
by February 15, 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 10891 (1972) (Pa.) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10855 (1972)
(Cal.) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10871 (1972) (Baltimore) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10858 (1972) (District
of Columbia proper) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10871 (1972) (Prince George's and Montgomery
Counties in the District region).
27. A federal district court ordered the Administrator to promulgate regulations
setting forth an implementation plan for the control of photochemical oxidants in
California. Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 E.R.C. 1728, 1731 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The
Administrator determined that an 87% reduction in vehicle miles travelled would be
necessary in order to attain an acceptable photochemical oxidant level. This required
a two year extension of the deadline for meeting photochemical and carbon monoxide
standards. California was given until 1977 to meet this deadline. 38 Fed. Reg.
2194-95 (1973).
28. 37 Fed. Reg. 10889 (1972) (Pennsylvania given until 1977 to attain photochemical and carbon monoxide standards); 37 Fed. Reg. 10871 (1972) (Baltimore
given until 1977 to attain photochemical and carbon monoxide standards); 37 Fed.
Reg. 10871 (1972) (Prince George's and Montgomery Counties given until 1977 for
the attainment of photochemical and carbon monoxide standards).
29. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per curiam). The Administrator promptly responded to the decision. 37 Fed.
Reg. 10889 (1972), as amended 40 C.F.R. § 52.2022 (1973)
(1977 extension for
Pennsylvania withdrawn) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10851 (1972), as amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.222,
52.237 (1973) (1977 extension withdrawn for California) ; 37 Fed. Reg. 10871 (1972),
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were found to be deficient because they failed to satisfy the minimum requirements prescribed by that statute. 30 Accordingly, the Administrator
promulgated transportation control plans 8l for the four regions. Although
the states accepted parts of these plans, they vigorously rejected others.32
In order to understand the intensity of the states' reaction, knowledge of
the content of some of the contested portions is necessary.
Each state objected to provisions requiring it to establish and enforce
retrofit or auto inspection programs or both.38 In order to ensure the
realization of these objectives, the provisions instructed the states to supply
a compliance schedule for each program; to provide the Administrator with
the text of any necessary enabling regulations or statutes; to offer assurances that funding would be available, including the text of any funding
legislation; and to guarantee that the programs would be in operation
by a specified date. 84 A related provision directed the states to stop
registering private vehicles that failed to comply with federal standards. 35
Other contested provisions were unique to individual plans. For example,
parts of the National Capital Region plan36 ordered the local authorities
as amended 40 C.F.R. § 52.1072 (1973) (1977 extension for Baltimore withdrawn) ;
37 Fed. Reg. 10871 (1972), as amended 40 C.F.R. § 52.1072 (1973) (1977 extension
for Prince George's and Montgomery Counties withdrawn).
30. For a discussion of the defects in the original state plans, see notes 22 to
25 supra.
31. The courts used the term transportation control plan to denote the applicable
implementation plan for a particular region.
32. For a discussion of the particular issues involved in each state, see the discussion of the circuit court cases in notes 46 to 72 and accompanying text infra.
33. The following regulations ordered the institution of retrofit programs. Pennsylvania: 40 C.F.R. § 522039 (1974). National Capital Region: 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.492.496 (D.C.), 52.1091-.1094 (Md.), 52.2444-.2447 (Va.) (1974). California: 40 C.F.R.
§§ 52.244-.245 (1974). Maryland: 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.1096-.1100 (1974). A retrofit
device ensures the injection of additional air into an internal combustion engine,
causing a more complete use of fuel and a reduction of hydrocarbon emissions.
The following regulations ordered the institution of inspection programs.
National Capital Region: 40 C.F.R. § 52.490 (D.C.), § 52.1089 (Md.), § 52.2441
(Va.) (1973). California: 40 C.F.R. § 52.242(d) (1974). Maryland: 40 C.F.R. §
52.1095(c) (1974).
34. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA,
521 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1975) ; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 979-80
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 1974).
35. This provision was included in the regulations ordering operation of inspection programs. The regulations are listed in note 29 supra.
36. Several collateral promulgations were no longer at issue at the time of the
court of appeals decision. Shortly before the decision the Administrator had revoked
promulgations concerning inspection and retrofit programs for light-duty fleet vehicles.
Earlier, the Administrator had withdrawn provisions imposing a surcharge on commuter parking. 39 Fed. Reg. 1848 (Jan. 15, 1974). Similarly, the Administrator had
deferred rulemaking on vapor recovery devices. 40 Fed. Reg. 1126-27 (1975). Finally,
the Administrator had suspended parking management regulations. 40 Fed. Reg.
2585-86 (Jan. 14, 1975).
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to purchase an additional 475 buses by 197737 and to construct exclusive
express bus lanes and exclusive bikeways in accordance with EPA blueprints.38 Portions of the California plan ordered the state to establish a
computerized car pool matching system"9 and to identify preferential
bus and car pool lanes on existing roads. 40 Many of these provisions
imposed detailed reporting requirements that would enable the EPA to
monitor state compliance.
These plans exhibit a common design: through them the EPA sought
to thrust upon the states the responsibility for formulating and enforcing
programs to meet the clean air standards. In his general preamble to
the transportation control plans, the Administrator articulated the philosophy underlying this approach.
Direct Federal enforcement and massive, duplicative Federal
programs aimed at vehicles on an individual basis were not the means
contemplated by the Act to solve these problems. It is clearly necessary
control plans be carried out
that implementation of transportation
41
at the State and local level.
The Administrator attempted to ensure the success of this approach by
incorporating the commands of the minimum requirements provision into
the implementation plan promulgated for each state; a failure to comply
with these requirements would constitute a violation of the plan 42 thereby
subjecting the state to the sanctions of the enforcement provision. 43 In
this way the promulgation and enforcement provisions could be used
to compel a state to adopt measures to implement the plan if it failed to
do so voluntarily. Under this approach, the Administrator could prescribe
37. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.476(g) (D.C.), 52.1080(g) (Md.), 52.2435(e) (1974) (Va.).
38. The regulations requiring the construction of bus lanes can be found at: 40
C.F.R. §§ 52.476(h) (D.C.), 52.1080(h) (Md.), 52.2435(f) (1974) (Va.). The
bikeway regulations can be found at: 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.491 (D.C.), 52.1091 (Md.),
52.2552 (Va.).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 52.257(c) (1974).
40. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.258(f), 52.259(f) (1974).
41. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,633 (1973).
42. The Administrator issued the promulgations in connection with a regulation
that stated in part:
Failure to comply with any provisions of this part shall render the . . . Governmental entity so failing to comply in violation of a requirement of an applicable
implementation plan and subject to enforcement action under Section 113 of the
Clean Air Act [A] ... Governmental entity will be considered to have failed to
comply with the requirements of this part . . . if the compliance schedule when
40 C.F.R. § 52.23 (1974).
43. The Administrator subsequently contended in Brown that the available sanctions included "injunctive relief, imposing a receivership on certain state functions,
holding a state official in civil contempt with a substantial daily fine until compliance
is secured, and requiring a state to allocate funds from one portion of its budget to
another in order to finance the undertakings required by the Agency." Brown v. EPA,
521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975).
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the content of state legislation, direct the expenditure of state funds to
implement programs, and seek sanctions against a state that resisted.
The states contested the Administrator's view of his authority under
the amendments. They argued that if his interpretation were correct, the
direct interference with state governmental processes would violate the
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government and transgress
the principles of federalism.44 The states insisted that Congress intended
state participation in the formulation and administration of clean air
programs to be strictly voluntary. 45 The promulgation and multiple violation provisions, according to the states, made federal action a complete
substitute for state action. In brief, the position of the states was that
they could not be forced to serve as agents of the federal government.
Of the four circuits, the Third Circuit, in Pennsylvania v. EPA,4"
adopted the most liberal interpretation of the Administrator's authority.
The issue before the court was whether a transportation control plan
promulgated by the Administrator might contain a provision requiring
Pennsylvania to enact and enforce a retrofit program. 47 In dealing with
this issue, the court considered the legislative history of the amendments.
Because the purpose of the amendments was the improvement of air quality
through the programs embodied in the minimum requirements, it was clear
that Congress had contemplated the implementation of those programs.
The unresolved question was whether federal or state authorities would
bear the ultimate responsibility for implementation. Given the opposition
to federal implementation expressed in the congressional commentary
on the amendments, the Third Circuit decided to defer to the Administrator's determinations that federal implementation was not feasible and that
the burden of enforcement was properly placed on the states.4 8
The court then noted that the minimum requirements directed the
states to provide in their implementation plans for the institution of auto
inspection programs. From its reading of the legislative history, the court
inferred that Congress must have therefore intended this inspection requirement to be enforceable against the states. Since a federal plan might
44. The states sought review of the regulations pursuant to section 1857h-5(b)
(1), which grants a right of review in the court of appeals.
45. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838 (9th Cir. 1975) ; District of Columbia v.
Train, 521 F.2d 971, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
47. Pennsylvania argued that the retrofit program was neither practicable, well
considered or timely given the latest testing techniques. But the court noted that under
proper testing conditions, the retrofit program produced a satisfactory reduction of
automobile emissions. The program had been analyzed on a cost effectiveness basis.

Id. at 251-52.
48. Id. at 257-58. The court stated: "The legislative history of the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, far from demonstrating such a prohibition, shows a clear

expectation that the states would have to implement significant portions of their trans,
portation control plans and indicates an underlying assumption that they could be required to do so." Id. at 258.
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direct the states to institute auto inspection programs, one of the minimum
requirements, it was thought unlikely that Congress would have objected
to the imposition of the similar program of retrofit installation, even
though it was not one of the minimum requirements. 49 Thus, according to
the court, a federal implementation plan might require a state to establish
a retrofit program according to federal specifications.
The transportation control plan at issue in District of Columbia v.
Train"° was more complicated than the Pennsylvania plan; it involved the
establishment of an inspection program, construction of express bus lanes,
purchase of buses, and the institution of a retrofit program. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals focused on the power of the Administrator
under the promulgation and enforcement provisions. Although recognizing that the Administrator has the authority to regulate a state whose
activities constitute a direct or indirect source of pollution, the court could
not find any statutory language authorizing the Administrator to compel
a state to enact the statutes and regulations necessary to fill in the details
of the federal implementation plans. 5' The court ruled that rejection of a
state plan obligated the Administrator to promulgate immediately a complete and effective implementation plan to serve in its place ;52 he could
not delegate this responsibility to the states. Concluding that this was
the logical and obvious design of the statutory structure, the court noted that
had Congress intended to adopt the novel approach advocated by the Administrator, it would have made that intent clear in the statute.5 3 The language
of the enforcement provision further supported the court's view of the
meaning of the statute. The single violation section required that a
separate notice of violation be provided to both the violator and the state.
This procedure would introduce the awkward element of double notice if
a state's failure to adopt an implementation plan constituted a violation.54
Moreover, the widespread violations section provided that where the violations result from the failure of the state to enforce the plan, a period of
49. Id. at 258.

50. 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
51. 521 F.2d at 984, 986.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 984. This position reflects a canon of statutory interpretation known as
the policy of clear statement. Application of the canon means that a court will not
attribute to a legislature an intention to adopt a radically different policy or procedure
unless such an intent is clearly expressed. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEau
PROCESS:

BASIC

PROBLEMS

IN

THE

MAKING AND

1412-13 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as

HART

APPLICATION OF LAW 1240-41,
& SACKS] ; notes 113 to 116 and

accompanying text infra. Accord Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 228 (4th Cir.
1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834, 839 (9th Cir. 1975).
54. 521 F.2d at 985. One notice would identify the state as a violator, the truant
enforcer or legislator of the administrator's promulgated plan. The second "neutral"
notice to the state pollution agency would permit it to accumulate notices of federal
enforcement actions for administrative purposes. For a further explanation of the
double notice problem in the amendments, see note 90 infra.
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federally assumed enforcement would follow. This language implied that
5
inadequate state enforcement was not itself a violation.M
Thus the Administrator's attempt to direct the conduct of state legislatures by treating
noncompliance as a violation was unwarranted. Accordingly, the court
vacated those portions of the federal regulations that ordered the states to
enact statutes and regulations and to take other actions necessary to complete the regulatory scheme.5 6
The court indicated, however, that other portions of the federal plan
which did not require action by state legislatures might still be valid. It
suggested that regulations requiring the adoption of laws by a state were
distinguishable from those seeking only to obtain state enforcement of
federal plans.
In other words, even though the states may not be compelled to enact
statutes to fill in the details of the Administrator's regulations, it may
be argued that they can be ordered to take actions which implement
the federally imposed regulations.57
Although the statute did not expressly make this distinction, the court
observed that such a distinction would preserve the autonomy of state
legislatures yet avoid the creation of a new federal bureaucracy. This
element, as well as the strident expressions of opposition to federal enforcement found in the congressional commentary, led the court to conclude
that the states might be compelled to administer an EPA program. 58
Furthermore, the court affirmed those portions of the plan requiring the
purchase of additional buses and the construction of exclusive bus lanes.
It identified state transportation and highway construction policies as
indirect sources of pollution that could be regulated in the same manner
as direct pollution from state vehicles.5 9
In Brown v. EPA,6 0 the Ninth Circuit described the federally promulgated plan as an attempt to "reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress."' In light of the awesome consequences for federalism
that would result from state legislators being forced to undertake the
Administrator's errands, the court refused to resolve the ambiguities of the
statute in favor of the Administrator. Accordingly, the federal regulations,
which required California to establish inspection and retrofit programs
and to alter state transportation policies relating to buses, car pools, traffic
55. 521 F.2d at 986-87.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 987. For example, a state could not be compelled to enact the legislation necessary to establish an inspection program, but it could be required to deny
registration to motorists who failed to comply with federal law.
58. Id. at 987-88, 995.
59. Id. at 989-90.
60. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). Two companion cases, Arizona v. EPA, 52'
F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975) and Alaska v. EPA, 521 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1975), were
resolved on identical grounds.
61. 521 F.2d at 839.

596
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62
patterns, and mass transit planning were held to be unenforceable.
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that states could be regulated as
polluters, it determined that the general structure of the amendments failed
to indicate any congressional intention to punish a state that failed to
reorganize its transit system or regulate third persons. 63 With respect to
the single violation section, the court distinguished between violations by a
state acting in its governmental capacity and violations by a state acting
in a private capacity; it also noted the double notice problem caused by
64
classifying recalcitrant state legislatures and executives as violators.
The distinction between states and violators also influenced the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of the widespread violations section. The court
maintained that if Congress had intended to compel the states to enact
legislation and supply enforcement, it would have specifically subjected
states, as persons, to the "period of federally assumed enforcement." 65 In
the absence of language to that effect, federal promulgations could not
be used to delegate enforcement responsibilities to a state during the
"period of federally assumed enforcement" which arose from the discovery
of widespread violations.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the ambiguities as to the Administrator's
proper function under the promulgation and enforcement provisions and
acknowledged that the statute and legislative history could be interpreted
to support the Administrator's position. Nonetheless, the court indicated
that the language and structure of the Act sufficiently refuted the Administrator's theory of state subservience. In addition, it suggested that
fundamental principles of federalism, which provide for the preservation
of state control over its own governmental processes, invalidated the
Administrator's position. The court was also troubled by the possibility
that the approach urged by the EPA could sever the taxation power on the
state level.66 These apprehensions about the "ability of states 'to function

62. Id. at 831.
63. See id. at 832-36. The Ninth Circuit observed that the congressional debates
revealed divergent viewpoints on the extent of federal enforcement intended under
§ 1857c-8. On the floor of the House, one congressman stated that:
[i]f a State hangs back and fails to move out, the Federal Government will take
over and make rules and regulations amounting to a State plan. Machinery for
forcing a plan upon a State is spelled out including penalties of $10,000 a day for
failing to act.
521 F.2d at 836, quoting 116 CONG. REc. 19206 (1970) (remarks of Congressman
Springer). Another congressman, referring to the same provision in the House draft
of § 1857c-8, clearly implied that the provision penalized only polluters. Id. quoting
116 CONG. REC. 19218 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Vanik). The Ninth Circuit
also referred to ambiguities in the committee reports. For example, the Senate report
emphasized that upon failure of the state to enforce federal guidelines against polluters,
"[the Administrator] would be expected to use the full force of Federal law." Id. at 835,
quoting from S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1970).
64. See 521 F.2d at 833-35.
65. See id. at 834.
66. Id. at 840.
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effectively in a federal system' under the Administrator's interpretation"67
led the court to resolve the ambiguities in favor of California.
The Fourth Circuit, in Maryland v. EPA,68 described the federal
promulgations that sought to transform state legislatures into auxiliary
departments of the EPA as "astonishing." 69 Although the constitutional
implications of the Administrator's action troubled the court, it refrained
from ruling on the constitutional validity of the regulations. 70 Instead, it
resolved the issue through statutory interpretation. The Fourth Circuit
found no specific language in the promulgation provision authorizing the
Administrator to direct a state to enact statutes and regulations to implement the plan he prescribed. 71 Rather, it found that responsibility for
developing such regulations rested with the EPA. Moreover, the court
noted, the structure of the Act did not evidence any intention on the part
of Congress to abandon the customary approach of securing state coopera72
tion through the use of threat and promise.
The four circuit court opinions present three major problems in
interpreting the statutory scheme of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.
The first problem relates to whether the promulgation provision allows the
Administrator to delegate to the states the responsibility for developing the
standards and programs that are to comprise the implementation plan.
Second, there is the question whether the federal promulgation may direct
a state to administer and enforce the programs contained in a plan.
Finally, it is not clear whether the Administrator may seek sanctions under
the enforcement provision against a state that refuses to follow the directions of a federal promulgation. This last problem relates obviously to
the other two - if the adoption and enforcement provisions do not bind
the states, their inclusion in a federal plan is meaningless.
The four courts reached different conclusions on these issues. The
Third Circuit did not distinguish between regulations requiring adoption by
a state legislature and those ordering enforcement by a state. It simply
held that Pennsylvania might be compelled to establish a retrofit program,7 3
and that sanctions would be available if the state refused to comply. The
District of Columbia Circuit determined that the states might not be
required to adopt the regulations and statutes necessary for a comprehensive implementation plan but the states might be required to administer
the programs of an EPA plan. 74 It also found that federal regulations
might control state activities that constitute indirect sources of pollution,
such as the building and maintenance of state highways. The opinions
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 842.
530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
See notes 46 to 49 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 50 to 59 and accompanying text supra.
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of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits evinced agreement with the District of
Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the statute did not authorize the Administrator to control the state legislative process. 75 But they did not
accept the District of Columbia Circuit's distinction between regulations
requiring state enforcement and those requiring state legislation. According to their view of the statute, state participation in the implementation of
EPA plans was to be voluntary.
C.

Interpretation of the Statute

Each of the four circuit courts was confronted with the problem of
interpreting a complex and ambiguous statute. Although three of the four
courts agreed that the powers asserted by most of the contested regulations
exceeded the Administrator's authority, these courts applied different considerations in reaching this conclusion. Admittedly, no system for analyzing
and resolving ambiguities in statutes has been precisely formulated or
universally adopted. 76 Nonetheless, there would seem to be certain elements that should be considered in the process of interpreting a statute.
This section will identify these elements and apply them to the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970.
Analysis of a statute should begin with the identification of the ambiguities to be resolved. The 1970 Clean Air Amendments contain several types of
ambiguities. One type of ambiguity arises from the language of the statute: for instance the meaning of "for" in the part of the promulgation provision authorizing the Administrator to "prepare . . . an implementation
plan ... for a State" is unclear. The Administrator contended that regula-

tions directing the states to supply all the details of an implementation plan
satisfied this statutory command. 77 In contrast, the states insisted that this
use of "for" required the Administrator to develop a fully operative implementation plan. 78 There was a similar disagreement over whether a "violation" of the enforcement provision included a state's refusal to comply
with the provisions of an implementation plan involving adoption of state
legislation or state administration of an EPA program.
The structure of the statute creates another type of ambiguity. The
statute does not explain the relationship between the minimum requirements
and the promulgation provisions; there is no description of the proper
content of a federal implementation plan or the respective roles of state
and federal authorities with regard to the formulation and administration
of the plan.
75. See notes 60 to 72 and accompanying text supro.
76. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 529-35 (1947) ; Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395

(1950).
77. See notes 41 to 43 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 44 to 45 and accompanying text supra.
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There would seem to be three levels of interpretation on which a
court could operate in resolving the ambiguities presented by this statute.
First, the court could simply accept the EPA's interpretation. Second, it
could attempt to resolve the ambiguities through scrutiny of the language
and structure of the statute. Finally, it could consider other relevant
sources such as legislative histories, legislative purpose, or basic legal
principles.
Operating on the first level, a court would adopt the interpretation
of the statute expressed in the Administrator's regulation. 79 The result
here would be that the Administrator might require the states to formulate
and administer implementation plans and treat noncompliance as a violation for which sanctions would be available. There is some authority for
judicial deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute,
but although the Third Circuit adopted this approach the considerations
that justify deference in some instances are not present here.80 The policy
of deference to administrative interpretation developed in response to those
situations involving agency expertise or internal policy where the impact
of judicial acceptance of the agency's position was limited."' In contrast,
adoption of the Administrator's interpretation of the Clean Air Amendments would significantly affect relations between the federal and state
governments. Because adoption of the interpretation offered by the EPA
would mark a startling deviation from the prior congressional approach
to implementing commerce legislation and would raise significant constitutional issues, independent judicial interpretation of the statute is appro8 2
priate.
The second level of interpretation entails scrutinizing the language
and structure of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Professor Dickerson
has characterized this analysis as the cognitive aspect of interpreting
79. See text of regulation in note 42 supra.
80. The Third Circuit expressed the view that the interpretation of the EPA was
entitled to great deference, particularly since the statutory provisions were new and
had not been applied. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 257 (3d Cir. 1974). None
of the other circuits accepted this view.
81. The case relied upon by the Third Circuit to justify deference can be distin-

guished on this basis. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), involved a dispute over
the Department of Interior's interpretation of one of its regulations, which restricted
the use of certain federal lands. Since the controversy centered on an administrative
regulation rather than a statute, deference was particularly appropriate. Id. at 16.
82. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), the Court stressed the importance
of independent judicial evaluation of administrative decisions.
Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. Such
review is always properly within the judicial province, and courts would abdicate
their responsibility if they did not fully review such administrative decisions.
Id. at 291-92.
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statutes.8 3 By describing the process as cognitive, he seeks to depict the
focus of the courts' scrutiny as a process of discovering the meaning of
the words used in the statute.8 4 This process entails an investigation of
the words and the statutory context in which the words are used. To the
extent that such an investigation can resolve the questions before a court,
there is no need for recourse to more problematic indices of legislative
meaning. 5
Unfortunately, a cognitive investigation of the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970 cannot resolve the controversy between the EPA and the states.
The ambiguities in the promulgation and enforcement provisions that
engendered the dispute cannot be eliminated solely by reference to the
statutory language and its context. Nevertheless, a close reading of the
statute lends some support to the states' contention that compulsion of
state legislatures was not intended.
The promulgation provision, section 1857c-5(a), states that in the
event a state plan proves inadequate, the Administrator is to prepare an
implementation plan for the state. According to section 1857c-5(d), a
promulgated plan, or its most recent revision, becomes the applicable implementation plan for the state. Under the enforcement provision, section
1857c-8, a violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation
plan allows the Administrator to seek sanctions against the violator.
Since a promulgated plan immediately becomes binding, the implication
is that the plan should be complete when issued. The EPA regulations
that seek to delegate the responsibility for formulating the details of an
implementation plan to the states would therefore conflict with the apparent
design of the statute. Such a reading would correspond with the District
83. R. DICxERSON,

THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

217-37

(1975).

84. With respect to the cognitive function, Dickerson observes:
Because communications are often imperfectly framed or inadequately transmitted, a corresponding part of the message is lost unless the reader, by logical
induction and deduction, makes a compensating effort to search the relevant and

sometimes competing elements to find the most plausible basis for a reliable, though
more attenuated, inference of intended meaning. This often takes some doing,
especially with complex communications such as statutes.
[T]he court has a responsibility to resolve the controversy that it may not
evade. Because this responsibility requires deference to the legislature, the court
is justified in initiating its own solution only if a legally adequate answer cannot
be found, through the normal processes of cognition, within the statute and
its proper context.

R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 22 (footnotes omitted). The process of cognition requires objectivity and a sensitivity to usage, as well as a recognition of the various tacit
assumptions that affect meaning. Id. at 236-37.

85. See supranote 83, at 22.
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of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the EPA must promulgate a comprehensive plan, rather than place the burden of doing so on the states.8 6
The language of the widespread violations section of the enforcement
provision appears to support the states' argument that the refusal to enforce
a federal plan does not constitute an actionable violation. The provision
authorizes a period of federally assumed enforcement to begin when it
appears that widespread violations have resulted from the failure of the
state to enforce the plan.8 7 This language apparently implies that a state's
failure to enforce a plan, although perhaps an inducement to violations, is
not a violation itself.88
Finally, there is the problem of double notice under both the single
and widespread violations sections of the amendments. If the recalcitrance
of a state constitutes a violation, both sections would seem to require the
delivery of two separate notices to a state, one addressing the state as a
violator, the other as a governmental entity. The District of Columbia
Circuit considered this procedure to be so inherently inefficient that its design could not be reasonably attributed to Congress.8 9 This problem can
be avoided, of course, if states, acting as governmental entities, are not
considered violators. 90
But textual analysis of this sort cannot conclusively answer the substantive questions of statutory interpretation raised by the Clean Air
Amendments, for each inference can be reasonably rejected. That a
promulgated plan becomes operative immediately does not necessarily mean
that it must be comprehensive and complete. Nothing in the statute requires that a plan be immediately effective against every person; instead
the initial impact may be limited to "persons" who are states. In that
86. 521 F.2d at 986. Accord, Maryland v. EPA, 530 F2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975);
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).

87. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970).
88. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 985-86 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
89. Id. at 985, 986.
90. Language in provisions other than section 1857c-8(a) (1)-(2) seems to
present the same problem of unnecessary notice to a state. As a "person" under section
1857h(e), a state may have the capacity to sue the Administrator as a citizen plaintiff
under section 1857h-2(b). Section 1857h-2(b) requires that a plaintiff citizen give
notice to the state of his action against the administrator. The notion of a state, as
plaintiff, giving notice to itself is anomalous. This anomaly may be avoided, however, by noting that under section 1857h-2(b) the plaintiff must also notify the federal
government. Distinct and separate parties may be the recipients of the notice, the
federal government and the state. Thus, even when a state is a plaintiff, the notice
requirement retains some meaning for the federal authorities. See Luneburg, FederalState Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM.
L. REv. 637, 663-64 (1973).
By contrast, section 1857c-8(a)(1)-(2) does not identify two separate recicipents of notice from the federal government. If a state were a violator, no other
party but the state would exist to receive the notice. In short, unlike section 1857h2(b), section 1857c-8(a)(1)-(2) provides no escape from the dilemma of double
notice to the same party.
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event, the only actionable violation would be the state's failure to adopt
legislation or enforce federal programs. Although the language of the
widespread violations section clearly indicates that a state's failure to
enforce an implementation plan does not subject it to the liabilities of the
section, that language does not indicate whether the single violation section
applies to recalcitrant state governments. The refusal to supply the
governmental cooperation requested by a federal implementation plan can
be considered a single violation by a single party. Analysis of the double
notice problem is similarly inconclusive. Every court recognized that
the statute covered improper emissions by state vehicles, yet that type of
state violation also necessitates the delivery of two separate notices to
the state governments. Since the anomaly of double notice is presented
by state violations that are clearly punishable under the Act, it is disingenuous to ascribe to Congress an intention to avoid this duplication of
effort.
The third level of interpretation requires consideration of relevant
materials other than the statute itself. The source of external material to
which courts most commonly refer is legislative history. Reliance on this
device has been criticized because of uncertainty about its reliability and
relevance."1 Nevertheless, legislative history if used cautiously can be a
useful tool in interpreting a statute that cannot be fully understood through
textual analysis. According to Professor Dickerson, the consideration of
legislative history relates to the creative function of statutory interpretation.9 2 He suggests that if the cognitive analysis of a statute fails to
resolve the controversy, a court must formulate its own explanation of
the statute's proper operation. This formulation can involve contemplation
of the legislative intent in enacting the particular statute or a consideration
of more general objectives and principles. To the extent that legislative
history illuminates these elements, its use is proper. 93 The statutory history
of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments that relates to the consequences of
91. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ; R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 162-64.
92. In describing the creative function, Professor Dickerson has noted that:

We may conclude also that, whenever a court can say only "We cannot be reasonably sure which, if any, of a wide range of compatible readings was probably
the intended one," or "What we perceive to be the meaning of the statute does
not adequately resolve the current controversy," the meaning that it thereupon
assigns to the statute involves the kind of disciplined creativity that is more appropriately classed as "judicial lawmaking." The problem of choosing among a number of plausible alternatives, not calling for an act of discovery, is not one of fact,
but of judicial responsibility discharged according to principles peculiar to the law.
R. DICKERSON, supra note 83, at 27 (footnotes omitted). The nature of this disciplined
creativity in a particular case depends on the court's use of external factors. Dickerson
discusses the most common sources of external reference such as legislative intent,
id. at 66-86, legislative purpose, id. at 87-102, legislative history, id. at 137-67, and
the notion of statutory context, id. at 103-24.
93. See HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 1262-64.
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federal promulgations furnishes some insights into the nature of the Administrator's power. This portion of the history deals with the circumstances under which the Administrator may invoke the enforcement
provisions against state governments. The House Committee indicated
that the federal authorities should assume responsibility for enforcing
federally promulgated implementation plans just as they assumed responsibility for the execution of other anti-pollution plans, such as programs for
the reduction of pollution from new stationary sources. 94 This initial
commentary, which indicated that federal authorities would replace state
governments in the enforcement of both stationary source requirements
and implementation plans, is reinforced by the House Committee's protracted commentary relating exclusively to the stationary source requirements. 95 Commenting on the new stationary source requirements alone,
the committee stated that federal authorities might promulgate regulations
for new stationary sources unless the state decided to adopt such regulations
itself. 96 Federal regulations and state adoption of new stationary source
requirements were apparently viewed as alternative possibilities; for if
federal promulgations would ultimately compel state adoption, deference
to the state's earlier decision on whether to adopt the new stationary
source requirements would be meaningless. Therefore, compelled adoption
seems not to have been contemplated. Nor does the original House draft
disclose any intention that federal authorities might compel the state
to enforce stationary source requirements. The committee report strongly
suggests that a state agency's refusal to enforce stationary source requirements would not amount to a violation of the federal plan. 97 To the extent
that these commentaries on the stationary source requirements reflect
the attitude toward implementation plans, it would seem that the House
Committee did not contemplate the compulsion of state legislative and
enforcement measures.
The final version of the amendments, however, did not embrace the
House Committee's apparent opposition to compelled state involvement.
Although the sections governing new stationary source requirements do
94. The House draft stated that state action to abate air pollution "shall be encouraged and shall not be displaced by Federal enforcement action except as otherwise
provided by [provisions governing implementation plans and new stationary sources]."
H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1970) (emphasis added).
95. Cf. Llewellyn, suprd note 76, at 402 (Canon of Construction No. 6, similar
statutes, and presumably provisions in the same statute having the same objective, are
to be read in pari materia).
96. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
97. Id. The House committee report indicated that upon violation of the stationary
source emission standards, federal authorities shall notify state agencies as well as
violators. The language in this commentary on the House committee draft, unlike
the language in section 1857c-8, clearly distinguished between state agencies and
violators, substituting "violators" for the imprecise word "persons." Thus, a state
agency's failure to enforce the plan could not constitute a violation.
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not require state participation,"8 the implementation plan provision directs
the states to draft the initial plan.9 9 One commentator has argued that
the differences between the provisions with respect to the extent of state
involvement suggests that the provisions relating to the promulgation of
federal implementation plans, unlike the provisions establishing new stationary source requirements, were intended to impose a duty on the
states, rather than present them with a choice. 100
Both the House and Senate reports referred to the conduct that would
violate a federally promulgated plan. For example, the original House
draft of the enforcement provisions recommended fines for "any person"
who failed to "abate such pollution."' 0 1 In discussing these sanctions, some
legislators mentioned only the control of pollution, perhaps implying that
the federal promulgations could not penalize a state for its failure to adopt
and enforce federal promulgations. 02 One legislator, however, specifically
stated that the House bill imposed fines upon states that failed to enact
and enforce federal programs against private citizens. 0 3 The final form
of the amendments, though, does not indicate whether direct and indirect
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(d) (1970).
99. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). See
notes 8 to 14 and accompanying text supra.
100. See Luneburg, supra note 90, at 667-70. Luneburg suggests that the amendments should be interpreted to allow the states greater flexibility in drafting their
implemenation plans than with stationary source requirements. Nevertheless, he contends that only considerations of practicality, rather than lack of statutory authority,
preclude the Administrator from requiring that states revise their own approved plans.
Id. at 637-38, 646 n.46. Under section 1857c-5 (a) (2) (H), the plan drafted by a state
must provide for revision upon the Administrator's instruction. It is possible to argue
that there is little difference between requiring a state to make changes in an approved
plan and ultimately requiring the state to establish or adopt federal plans. Luneburg's
theory of interpretation cannot be reconciled, however, with the policy of clear statement discussed in notes 113 to 116 and accompanying text infra.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970).
102. One congressman noted that the sanctions applied when any person failed
to take action "ordered by the [Administrator] to abate the pollution." 116 CONG. REC.
19209 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Jarman). Similarly another legislator noted
that if a state failed to enforce the plan, the Attorney General might bring suit "to
secure abatement of polluters" within the state. Id. at 19220 (1970) (remarks of
Congressman Monagan). Such remarks might imply that federal authorities may
force the abatement of pollution indirectly by forcing the states to enforce federal plans.
Nevertheless, it is more likely that they reflect the language of the House draft. It
seems to contemplate federal enforcement only against the polluters themselves.
103. Congressman Springer specifically stated that:
If a State hangs back and fails to move out, the Federal Government will take
over and make rules and regulations amounting to a State plan. Machinery for
forcing a plan upon a State is spelled out including penalties of $10,000 a day for
failing to act.
Id. at 19206 (1970).
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emission of pollutants constitute the sole violations of an implementation
plan. 04 One commentator has argued that this lack of clarity supports

the Administrator's position on enforcement, which seeks to classify a state's
failure to enforce a federal plan as a violation. 10 5

Differences between the statute and the Senate Committee's draft of
the promulgation provision also support the view that federal promulgations

may demand legislation and enforcement measures from the states. The
Senate's version of the promulgation provision provided that: "A plan

promulgated by the [Administrator] for any air quality control region shall
be... applicable.., as if such plan had been adopted by the subject State
and apprdved by the [Administrator]."106 Use of the phrase "as if" clearly

indicates that federally promulgated plans and state legislation were viewed
as alternatives. Promulgation of a federal plan would therefore foreclose any
recourse to state legislatures. This foreclosure would also negate any
asserted federal power to compel state legislation. In contrast, the final
version of the promulgation provision states that the Administrator
"shall . . . promptly prepare and publish .

.

. an implementation plan . . .

for a State." The use of "for" introduces ambiguities that did not exist
in the Senate version. It is possible to read the amended version to allow
the Administrator, in promulgating a plan for a state, to either preempt or
107
compel state legislation.
This analysis of the evolution of the text of the statute can be supplemented by consideration of the legislative debates. These debates concerned
the allocation of enforcement responsibility between federal and state
104. See Bracken, Transportation Controls Under the Clean Air Act: A Legal
Analysis, 15 B.C. IND. & COMm. L. REv. 749 (1974). Bracken has argued that the
promulgation provision authorized the Administrator to control persons who are
"elements in a chain which results in pollution by others," in addition to those actually
polluting the atmosphere. Id. at 766. Under this interpretation, the amendments would
not permit state authorities to acquiesce in pollution by private citizens using
state facilities. Id. at 764-65. Although the amendments do not expressly authorize
such actions against the states, it is troubling that there is no clear statement of the
necessary causal connection between pollution and a violation. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-1 (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(b) (1970) (use of phrase "contributing to
such pollution").
105. See Bracken, supra note 104, at 764-66. Bracken's theory of interpretation
cannot, however, be reconciled with the policy of clear statement, which this comment
employs to interpret the statute. The policy of clear statement is discussed at note 53
supra, and notes 113 to 116 and accompanying text infra.
106. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1970) (emphasis added). The
Senate draft was submitted by the Committee on Public Works.
107. An attempt to harmonize the Senate draft with the amendments as enacted
might also lead to the conclusion that federal promulgations are tantamount to state
legislation. See Luneburg, supra note 90, at 666-67. Reliance upon this Senate commentary in interpreting the promulgation provision would suggest, however, that this
"as if" language should be viewed as permissive rather than mandatory with regard
to state officers. Id.
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authorities. Congressman Staggers, the floor manager of the bill in the
House, remarked:
If we left it all to the Federal Government, we would have about
everybody on the payroll of the United States. We know this is not
practical. Therefore, the Federal Government sets the standards, we
tell the States what they must do and what standards they must meet.
These standards must be put into effect by the communities and the
States, and we expect them to have the men to do the actual enforcing.108
Both the Third Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted
this statement as a prospective endorsement of the Administrator's attempt
to compel state enforcement of federal programs. 10 9 Since it is assumed
that Congress intended that air quality standards be attained, the opposition
to the creation of federal enforcement machinery implies that Congress
expected the states to assume responsibility for the actual administration
of the anti-pollution effort.
Although these pieces of legislative history offer some guidance as to
congressional intentions, they are ultimately inconclusive. Tenuous inferences must be drawn in order to find significance in the alterations and
omissions in the language of the statute. 110 There is no indication that
Congress perceived the potential ambiguities of the statute or attempted
to resolve them. Although the statements made during the debates do not
suffer from this lack of clarity, reliance upon them is equally problematic.
Isolated statements made during debates constitute the least reliable
category of legislative history and absent supporting material should not
be afforded much weight."1 Viewed in their entirety the legislative matethe
rials do not disclose an intent on the part of Congress to depart from
112
traditional practice of federal enforcement of commerce legislation.
108. 116

CONG.

REc. 19204 (1970).

109. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ; Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 258 (3d Cir. 1974).

110. For example, the substitution of "for" in place of "as if" in the promulgation
provision discloses little about congressional intent. The change is ambiguous; "for"
can be interpreted as the equivalent of "as if." WEBSTER'S THIR NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 886 (1971). Thus the change may well have resulted from oversight rather
than design. The legislative history does not disclose a clear declaration of congressional intention with regard to federal compulsion of state governments in the
event that states refused to cooperate voluntarily.
111. See R. DicKEsoN, supra note 83, at 156-58.

112. In addition to relying on remarks from the floor debates, both the Third and
District of Columbia Circuits cited commentary on the House and Senate committee
drafts to support the conclusion that the amendments could be construed to authorize
the Administrator to compel state action. The relevant portion of the Senate report
stated: "The implementation plan . . . would . . . provide that . . . each region
develop motor vehicle inspection and testing programs . . . ." 500 F2d at 258, 521
F.2d at 987-88, quoting S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). Although
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Given the novelty of the EPA's interpretation of the amendments
and the absence of conclusive congressional support therefor, the cautious
approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits is appropriate. The preference
for caution in this situation can be explained by a canon of statutory interpretation known as the policy of clear statement. According to this canon,
a court will not interpret a statute so as to depart from general principles
and policies unless the legislature makes such an intention clear. 113
Federalism is one of those principles that courts hesitate to undermine
without a clear statement. 11 4 For example, in several recent cases involving
an attempt to extend federal criminal statutes to cover local activities, the
Supreme Court restricted the scope of the legislation. 115 In one of those
cases," 6 the Court explained its decision by reference to the policy of
clear statement.
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed
to have significantly changed the federal-state balance. . ..
[W]e
will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction. In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures
that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue,
the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." 7
This reasoning applies with equal force to the interpretation of the Clean
Air Amendments. The autonomy of state legislatures, like local control
over law enforcement, plays a crucial role in the federal-state balance.
Endorsement of the EPA's interpretation of the amendments would discongressional committee reports accompanying the draft of a bill are generally
considered a more reliable source of interpretive information than the casual and often
misleading remarks of legislators on the floor, such commentary cannot be removed
from its proper context. See HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 1266-67, 1284-86,
Even if it is assumed that a federally promulgated plan could compel the state to
establish or enforce an auto inspection program, the report does not support a similar
inference as to retrofit programs. The Senate report clearly indicates that the Senate
draft did not intend to require the inclusion of programs providing for installation of
retrofit devices on private vehicles in the initial state implementation plans. S. REP.
No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1970).
113. HART & SACKS, supra note 53, 1240-41, 1412-13.
114. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971); HART & SACKS, Supra
note 53, at 1240-41. Cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 198-200 (1964) (White,
J., dissenting).
115. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
116. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
117. Id. at 349. It is significant that the Court adopted this approach despite
statements during the debate by Senator Long, the sponsor of the bill, supporting an
expansive view of the statute's reach. The Court felt that Long's statements did not
supply the requisite degree of clarity since there was no evidence that other members
of Congress entertained similar views. Id. at 345-47.
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place basic state decisions. Because the requisite clear statement is missing,
the contentions of the EPA should be rejected.
Although it is therefore possible to resolve the controversy on statutory
grounds, the constitutional issues remain important. Two circuits confronted the constitutional issues and their reasoning should be evaluated.
Moreover, while this legislation is sufficiently ambiguous to allow courts
to avoid the constitutional questions, future legislation could be more
explicit. It is therefore desirable to determine whether legislation that
adopted the EPA's approach would be constitutional.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE

A.

EPA

REGULATIONS

The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty

If it is determined that the EPA regulations are authorized by the
statute, the question arises whether Congress, pursuant to the commerce
clause, has the power to compel states to adopt legislation and administer
federal programs. The Administrator's position was, in effect, that the
commerce power might be exercised to regulate state activity in the same
manner it is exercised to regulate private citizens. The states' position,
on the other hand, was that their legislative and executive branches could
not be made mere appendages of the federal government. Discussion of
the limits of the commerce power figured prominently in each of the four
circuit court opinions. The Supreme Court's decision in National League
of Cities v. Usery, however, delivered subsequent to the four appellate
decisions, set out a new approach to evaluating the constitutionality of
commerce legislation affecting state governments. Because National League
of Cities altered the prior doctrine in a fundamental manner, the reasoning
of the four circuit court decisions is no longer dispositive of the constitutionality of the EPA regulations." 8 This section will examine the constitutional analysis of the four circuits and then evaluate the constitutionality of
the EPA regulations in light of National League of Cities.
In upholding the regulations directing the institution of a retrofit
program, the Third Circuit ruled that the commerce power permitted
federal authorities to compel the states to regulate private citizens.
Pennsylvania had contended that the regulations exceeded the limits of the
commerce power by intruding upon uniquely governmental functions." 9
The court, however, considered the determinative question to be whether
118. For a constitutional analysis of the EPA regulations made prior to National
League of Cities, see Comment, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 213-22.
119. 500 F.2d at 259. The phrase "uniquely governmental" can be traced to
Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
582 (1946). New York dealt with the power of the federal government to tax New
York's mineral water business. Justice Frankfurter sought to identify state activities
that should be immune from federal taxation by reference to "State activities and
State-owned property that partake of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations." Id.

1977]

CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS

the state activities affected commerce and thus refused to rest its decision
on a governmental/proprietary distinction.
[T]he constitutionality of federal regulation of state activities is
subject to the same analysis as that of private activities; viz. the
determinative
factor is simply whether they have an impact on interstate
12 0
commerce.
Because state transportation policies had fostered the pollution by private
motorists, the regulations in this case were held to be valid. Thus, federal
authorities were allowed to alter Pennsylvania's transportation policies
by requiring the state to adopt and administer a retrofit program.
The District of Columbia Circuit reached different conclusions as to
the constitutionality of the various regulations ordering state enforcement
of EPA programs. Observing that federal legislation was authorized because pollution affected interstate commerce, the court found that Congress
might regulate direct or indirect sources of pollution regardless of whether
these sources were operated by a state. 121 Thus the regulations requiring
the construction of bus lanes and the purchase of additional buses were
valid because they sought to control an indirect source of pollution.' 2 2 The
state highway and bus systems were the indirect source of pollution in that
they influenced other parties to use direct sources of pollution, such as
automobiles.' 23 Acting under the commerce power, the federal government
might order the states to operate their transportation systems in accordance
with national standards.
The inspection and retrofit regulations presented a different problem
since their primary focus was the conduct of individual motorists; state
120. 500 F.2d at 261.
121. 521 F.2d at 989. The court indicated that it considered these state-owned
transportation systems to be analogous to the railroad operated by the state in United

States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). The Court in California ordered a state
railroad to comply with federal safety standards and install automatic coupling devices. The apparent implication is that the purchase of additional buses is equivalent
to the safety regulation at issue in California because it merely forces the state to
operate its transportation system in a manner that promotes the national health.
122. 521 F.2d at 989. This position resembled the Third Circuit's view that the
states could not indirectly encourage or aid pollution by private motorists, but the
District of Columbia Circuit adopted a more limited concept of indirect sources.
Whereas the Third Circuit supported federal regulation of "transportation systems,"
a generic term describing the whole collection of state policies that facilitated
pollution by private motorists, the District of Columbia Circuit identified only existing
state operations, such as roads, as indirect sources of pollution. Despite these differences in the definition of indirect sources, both circuits indicated that the acquiescence
of the states to pollution by private motorists, as well as the pollutants emitted
from state owned vehicles, could justify federal regulation of state activity.
123. The court noted, however, that state and local governments were not wholly
responsible for the perpetuation of policies that favored the automobile. The massive
appropriations of the federal highway program also had a significant effect. 521 F.2d
at 990 n.25.
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action had not contributed to the problem. Turning first to the provision
that prohibited the registration of noncomplying vehicles, the court ruled it
valid because it was merely a safety regulation designed to facilitate
commerce. 124 Moreover, the provision did not force the states to undertake
affirmative action; simply denying registration would be sufficient. But the
court struck down the provisions that required the state to establish and
enforce inspection and retrofit programs. The Administrator's attempt to
control the regulatory powers of the states, along with their personnel
and resources, was considered an unconstitutional intrusion upon state
125
sovereignty.
While the Ninth and Fourth Circuits rested their decisions on statutory
grounds, 12 6 the constitutional implications of the Administrator's position
induced both circuits to discuss the issue of relations between the federal
and state governments. The courts emphasized that the EPA approach
would grant the federal government free access to state treasuries and
unbridled authority to control state officers. 2 7 Both courts also expressed a
preference for the traditional technique of securing state cooperation
through threat and promise because this approach seemed more compatible
28
with principles of federalism.
The differences between the four circuit court decisions are indicative of the difficulties involved in defining the limits of the commerce
power as applied to the states. The Third Circuit reasoned that because
the policies of state governments permitted private citizens to operate
their motor vehicles in a manner that generated harmful levels of air
pollution, the states might be compelled to alleviate air pollution by
regulating private citizens. Although the Fourth and Ninth Circuits did
not rely on constitutional grounds, they implied that a distinction should
be made between the regulation of proprietary state operations and control
over purely governmental institutions, such as legislatures and executives. The District of Columbia Circuit, although invalidating inspection
and retrofit regulations that sought to compel the states to exercise their
regulatory powers, upheld regulation of state activity that constituted an
indirect source of pollution.
124. Id. at 991-92.
125. The court noted:
[Wlhere cooperation is not forthcoming, we believe that the recourse contemplated
by the commerce clause is direct federal regulation of the offending activity and
not coerced state policing of the details of an intricate federal plan under threat
of federal enforcement proceedings.

Id. at 993.
126. In resting the decision on statutory grounds, the courts followed the doctrine
of Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), which
holds that constitutional issues should be avoided if alternative grounds of decision
are availhle.
127. 5.30 F.2d 215, 227 (4th Cir. 1975) ; 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975).
128. 530 F.2d 215, 228 (4th Cir. 1975); 521 F.2d 827, 840 (9th Cir. 1975).
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National League of Cities v. Usery

In National League of Cities the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Rehnquist, reformulated its view of the limits of the commerce
power. A majority of five justices overturned the 1974 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended minimum wage standards
to practically all state employees. Further, the Court overruled its prior
decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 129 which had upheld the application of
minimum wage standards to employees in state schools and hospitals.
While acknowledging that the commerce clause granted broad power to
Congress, the Court ruled that this power might not be exercised so as
to vitiate state sovereignty.
We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.130
Thus state sovereignty was seen as a limit on the authority conferred by
the commerce clause.
In explaining the boundaries of the commerce clause, the Court in
National League of Cities emphasized the nature of the state interest
affected by the legislation. Two elements were considered significant.
First, the affected state activity was a traditional function of state government. Second, the federal legislation intruded upon policies that related to
integral operations of this traditional function.
[T] he Act displaces state policies regarding the manner in which
they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their
citizens require . . . But it cannot be gainsaid that the federal requirement directly supplants the considered policy choices of the States'
elected officials and administrators as to how they wish to structure
pay scales in state employment. 3 1
Justice Rehnquist did not attempt to precisely define either "traditional
governmental functions" or "integral operations." In describing the former,
129. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The Court in Wirtz had expressly considered whether
the commerce power might be limited by. notions of state sovereignty. It concluded
that such a limitation did not exist. The Court observed:
But while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of commerce
do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State
is engaged in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.
Id .at 196-97. This language could be read as an adoption of a governmental/
proprietary distinction since the schools and hospitals affected by the regulations
were originally proprietary. But the Court disavowed such a distinction in the Wirtz
opinion itself, id. at 195, and again in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975),
where it upheld a federal wage freeze affecting all state employees.

130. 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
131. 96 S. Ct. at 2472.
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he merely referred to activities that are "typical of those performed by
state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services.' u8 2 On the
latter point, he simply declared that the power to determine wages was
an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.'- 3 3 Under this two-pronged
analysis, the constitutionality of federal commerce legislation would be
determined solely by reference to its impact on state operations. If the
federal legislation supplants essential state decisions regarding the conduct of traditional governmental functions, the statute is unconstitutional.

13 4

132. 96 S. Ct. at 2474 & n.16. Although the Court failed to articulate precise
criteria for the identification of a traditional governmental function, it appears to have
given state activities a broader exemption from federal commerce regulations than the
exemption permitted by the governmental/proprietary standard employed in federal tax
clause cases. Had the Court defined traditional state functions in terms of a governmental/proprietary dichotomy, it would have upheld federal regulation of state activities with counterparts in the private sector, such as the state schools and hospitals
involved in Wirtz. See Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment
Immunity, 1974 DUKE L.J. 925, 936. The Court's decision to define the limits of
the commerce power in terms of the character of the state activity directly regulated
thus constituted a distinct departure from commerce clause precedent.
133. 96 S. Ct. at 2471. Justice Rehnquist did not elaborate on the precise relation
between the determination of wages and state sovereignty. Justice Brennan emphasized this omission in his dissent. Id. at 2484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. In adopting positions that favored the states, the Ninth and the Fourth Circuits lacked the benefit of the Supreme Court's new approach to commerce legislation
announced in National League of Cities. They had to reconcile their decision with
Wirtz. The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish between the EPA regulations,
which sought to control state governance of commerce and the statute in Wirtz, which
sought to regulate state economic activities. 521 F.2d at 838-39 (dictum). The Fourth
Circuit indicated that it would exempt from federal regulation those activities uniquely
attributable to state government, such as state legislatures. 530 F.2d at 225-26 (dictum).
Both circuits focused on the limiting language in Wirtz, which can be read as restricting the scope of federal commerce regulation to proprietary state activities. See
Comment, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 189, 218-19; note 66 and accompanying text supra. Further, both circuits would have declared the federal regulations unconstitutional in their entirety. They would have invalidated not only those
regulations that demanded state legislation, but also those that required state officers
to deny registration to nonconforming vehicles or identify bus lanes on existing state
highways. Yet these latter regulations are preemptive in character, seeking only
minimal cooperation from state authorities. The focus of both circuits on the inadvertent regulation of state legislatures or executives raises the insoluble problem of
deciding whether commerce regulations are concerned solely with state roadways
affecting commerce or whether they ultimately seek to control those state governments
whose decisions direct such activities.
The Court in National League of Cities recognized the federal interest in
regulating state activities that directly affect commerce yet limited the exercise of
federal power when it significantly impeded state decision-making processes. The
majority conceded the federal interest in minimum wage legislation and readily acknowledged the state's assumption of a proprietary role in the employment market.
96 S. Ct. at 2472. It did not, however, consider these facts to be dispositive.
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The Court's discussion of Fry v. United States,135 however, suggested that impact on state government may not be the exclusive consideration in determining constitutionality. In Fry the Court upheld the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, which imposed a temporary freeze on the wages
of state and local government employees. Justice Rehnquist distinguished
the Fry legislation from the legislation at issue in National League of Cities
on two grounds. First, he stated that the wage freeze did not displace
essential state decisions but merely prolonged the use of the existing wage
scales and reduced pressures on state budgets. Second, he observed that
the wage freeze legislation was a response to a national emergency that
threatened the well-being of the entire country.'3 The first of these distinctions, although reconciling National League of Cities with Fry, involves some questionable reasoning. A freeze on wages clearly displaces
state decisions concerning the wages of its employees and precludes independent state evaluation of the worth of a worker's services.' 13 The
135. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
136. 96 S. Ct. at 2474-75. Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Fry, however,
did not give much weight to these two factors. He observed that opposition to commerce legislation grounded on considerations of state sovereignty had been foreclosed by the decision in Wirtz. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975).
Severe economic dislocation may result from either minimum wage standards or wage
controls. One commentator has argued that although less affluent states might suffer
initially from the imposition of minimum wage standards, the imposition of such
standards might relax the economic barriers to interstate travel. He suggests that the
benefits of such wage increases might eventually register in the poorer states through
a simultaneous expansion of both their labor force and their tax base. See McCormack,
Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. Rav. 485,
496 n.69 (1973).
By contrast, wage controls would allow wealthier states to absorb surplus
pools of labor and increase public services. But it is less certain that wage controls
would have a similar effect in those states paying their employees at rates less than
the established ceiling. Wage controls might prevent an increase in public services
in those states that need them most by preventing those states from offering higher
wages and attracting more workers.
137. In his dissent Justice Brennan characterized as mere sophistry the argument that the Economic Stabilization Act did not displace state choices. He considered it "absurd to suggest that there is a constitutionally significant distinction
between curbs against increasing wages and curbs against paying wages lower than
the federal minimum." 96 S. Ct. at 2484. Indeed, Justice Brennan's position on this
point parallels the views expressed by Justice Rehnquist in his Fry dissent advocating
the invalidation of the Economic Stabilization Act. Insisting that the principle of
state government immunity against certain nondiscriminatory federal taxes should
apply equally to commerce legislation, Justice Rehnquist noted: "But where the
Federal Government seeks not merely to collect revenue as such, but to require the
State to pay out its moneys to individuals at particular rates, not merely state revenues
but also state policy choices suffer." 421 U.S. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). That
Justice Rehnquist in Fry apparently considered the Economic Stabilization Act so
intrusive as to be unconstitutional undercuts his suggestion in National League of
Cities that the Act "displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations
should be structured." 96 S. Ct. at 2475.
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second distinction does not suffer from defects in reasoning but it departs
from the proposed analysis, which concentrates exclusively on the impact
on the state, by suggesting that a compelling federal interest may justify
displacement of state decisions. 138 Reliance on the emergency doctrine
suggests that the determination of constitutionality may rest on a balancing of federal and state interests; if the federal legislation were to
reflect a strong national interest, some interference with the operation of
state governments might be permissible.
C.

National League of Cities and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970

Application of National League of Cities to the Clean Air Amendments and other legislation entails a consideration of two possible tests.
The first test follows Justice Rehnquist's analysis by examining whether
the federal legislation displaces essential state decisions regarding the
conduct of traditional governmental functions. The second test applies the
balancing analysis suggested by the Court's distinction of Fry by considering whether the federal interest is substantial enough to justify an
intrusion into the decision-making process of state governments.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis, which focused on the degree of intrusion
into certain types of state operations, is difficult to apply because it relies
on vague characterizations such as "essential decisions" and "traditional
governmental functions." Moreover, no criteria are provided for identifying traditional functions other than that the activity should relate to the
"dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services."' 139 Although this statement expresses a rather expansive view
138. In distinguishing Fry Justice Rehnquist emphasized the economic emergency
that had inspired the Economic Stabilization Act. "[A]ithough an emergency may
not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford
a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." 96 S. Ct. at 2475,
quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917). Furthermore, he distinguished Case
v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), which upheld as a proper exercise of the war power
the application of the Emergency Price Control Act to a sale of timber by the state
of Washington. 96 S.Ct. at 2475 n.18. The existence of a national emergency is
implicit in the operation of the war power; otherwise, there would be no basis for
treating the war power differently than the commerce power with respect to the
preservation of state sovereignty.
139. 96 S. Ct. at 2474. It should be noted, however, that the notion of traditional
governmental functions is not entirely novel. A similar standard has been employed
in the tax cases to delineate the scope of state immunity against nondiscriminatory
federal taxes. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Once it is determined that there should be a limit on the commerce power
based on state sovereignty, the problem becomes one of formulating a test to describe
the limit. Justice Rehnquist expressed his awareness of this problem in his Fry
dissent, which closely parallels the language and reasoning of his majority opinion in
National League of Cities.
It is conceivable that the traditional distinction between "governmental" and
"proprietary" activities might in some form prove useful in such line drawing. The
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of traditional functions, the Court specified that the classification does not
include state-owned railroads. 140 United States v. California,141 which dealt
with the application of federal safety regulations to a state railroad, was
expressly distinguished on the ground that the railroad was not an integral
part of the state's governmental activities. 142 The Court's treatment of
California suggests that the determinative characteristic of a traditional
governmental function is that it provides public services. National League
of Cities is distinguishable from California in that the state activities
affected by the minimum wage law were directed toward providing public
services whereas the railroad in California was not operated to benefit
the general public. 143 Thus, analysis of the EPA regulations must begin
with an examination of the nature of the state activities affected.
The various EPA regulations at issue in the four cases seek to control state transportation policies in the areas of highway construction, mass
transit planning, and motor vehicle administration. They command the
construction of express bus lanes and bikeways, 4 4 the purchase of addidistinction suggested in New York v. United States . .. between activities traditionally undertaken by the State and other activities, might also be of service ....
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Court in National League of Cities avoided reliance on a governmental/proprietary
distinction because that dichotomy did not protect proprietary operations, like hospitals,
which clearly deliver vital public services.
140. 96 S.Ct. at 2475 n.18.
141. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
142. 96 S.Ct. at 2475 n.18. California upheld the enforcement of federal safety
regulations against a state owned railroad. While acknowledging that the federal
taxing power could not be exercised against traditional state activities, the California
Court denied the existence of any similar limitation on the commerce power. Chief
Justice Stone observed: "But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to
regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been
authorized by Congress than can an individual." 297 U.S. at 185. This language
clearly contravenes the principle of state sovereignty espoused by National League of
Cities. Recognizing the conflict, Justice Rehnquist declared that Chief Justice Stone's
statement, which he labeled dicta, was simply wrong. 96 S. Ct. at 2475.
143. The railroad that was the object of regulation in California operated at the
San Francisco harbor. It serviced forty-five state-owned wharves and numerous industrial plants. There were several connections with interstate lines and the bulk of
the traffic had its origin or destination outside California. 297 U.S. at 181. The Court
concluded that "[ilts service is of a public character, for hire, and does not differ
in any salient feature from that which this Court ... held to be common carriage by
rail in interstate commerce within the meaning of the federal Hours of Service
Act." Id. at 182.
Thus, the railroad operation was not designed to furnish public services, but
was instead intended to guarantee state control over rail operations in the harbor
area. The railroad could not be considered a traditional governmental function.
Justice Rehnquist distinguished two other cases upholding federal regulation of state
railroads on this basis. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) ; California
v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
144. See note 38 supra.
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tional buses, 145 the institution of inspection and retrofit programs, 146 and
the denial of registration to those vehicles that fail to comply with federal
programs. 147 On the basis of the proposed reading of National League of
Cities, these operations would seem to qualify as traditional governmental
functions because they deliver public services through the provision of
highways, public transportation and vehicle registration. Once it is assumed that the regulations affect traditional governmental operations, the
relevant inquiry becomes whether they displace essential state policies
relating to those operations. That inquiry involves an examination of each
regulation.
The regulations that demand the construction of exclusive bus lanes
and the purchase of additional buses were upheld by the District of
Columbia Circuit. Because they displace state decisions about how to
structure the delivery of these services, however, the analysis in National
League of Cities would appear to refute their validity. 48 Acceptance of
these regulations would allow EPA officials to control state plans and funds
for highway construction and public transportation. 49 Such a result would
145. See notes 37 & 40 supra.
146. See note 33 supra.
147. See note 35 .upra.
148. Although the express lane and bus purchase regulations might conceivably
increase the delivery of mass transit services to the public, the -beneficial impact of
the federal regulations does not affect the assessment of their constitutionality. The
Court in National League of Cities observed that "particularized assessments of actual
impact" were not "crucial to resolution of the issue." 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
National League of Cities did not indicate whether regulations that indirectly
foreclose state policy choices could withstand constitutional scrutiny. While Congress
has seldom ordered the states to act in a particular fashion, federal commerce legislation has often influenced state activities by foreclosing certain courses of action. See
Hart, supra note 1, at 515-16. The question arises whether the EPA Administrator
could issue regulations that required future state highway construction to comply
with federal designs or that specified the purchase of only certain approved types of
buses. It is not clear whether such regulations would be considered to displace state
choices or whether the choices displaced would be deemed "essential." Although
National League of Cities did not address a statute of this variety, it did distinguish
Fry, which involved a negative command against exceeding wage ceilings, partly on
the ground that state choices were not displaced. The mere fact that a statute operates
through negative commands should not be dispositive of whether state choices are displaced. Foreclosure of action may affect the selection of state policies to the same
extent as direct orders. See note 136 supra. The issue of negative commands will be
presented to the Court in the EPA cases by the regulations that order states to deny
registration to private motorists who fail to comply with federal standards.
149. The constitutionality of regulations in the California Transportation Control
Plan that merely required the identification of express lanes is less clear. See note 40
supra. Since these regulations do not involve the expenditure of state construction
funds, it is possible to argue that they do not displace "essential" decisions. Nevertheless, to the extent that the regulations restructure local traffic patterns, they exert a
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conflict with the principles of state autonomy enunciated in National League
of Cities.
The regulations requiring the institution of inspection and retrofit
programs present a different problem. They do not seek to control the
policies of existing state agencies, but instead direct the legislative and
executive branches of state governments to establish new policies and
programs. Given the concern for state sovereignty expressed in National
League of Cities, the substantial intrusion into state affairs by these regulations makes them suspect. The formulation and enactment of legislation
is certainly a traditional state function and choice of policies and programs
forms an essential part of the legislative process. 150 Because these regulations attempt to usurp the legislative function of state governments by
demanding specific programs and dictating the actual terms of the statutes,
they cannot be reconciled with the National League of Cities standard for
significant impact on local policies. The constitutionality of these regulations is therefore problematic.
150. See DOCUMENTS ItLUSTRATrvE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE
AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 604-05 (C. Tansill ed.
1927). The Pickney proposal, advanced at the Federal Constitutional Convention,
would have allowed a federal repeal of state legislation, or, in the alternative, a
federal veto power over the legislation proposed for a state. The proposition failed.
The delegates feared an omnipresent national legislature with the authority to scrutinize the decisions of state governments. The delegates preferred preemption as an
effective check on state legislatures.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 represented an effort to regulate the policy
choices of state governments. One of its provisions required certain states to submit
proposals for changes in their electoral legislation to either the Attorney General or
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. I 1965), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. V 1975). The Court upheld the act, emphasizing
that state electoral machinery had been used to implement a policy of discrimination
against black voters. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Justice
Black dissented, characterizing the procedure as a federal veto power over state legislation. Id. at 358-59 (Black, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). But in
equating the 1965 act with the installation of a federal veto power over state legislatures, Justice Black mistook the rehabilitation of state electoral institutions for the
replacement of state legislatures. Since the command of the fifteenth amendment
directly addresses the states, federal regulation of state election machinery was proper.
Advocates of a broad interpretation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments have been careful to defend the substantial intrusions into state electoral processes by reference to the constitutional interest in eliminating state discrimination
against eligible voters. They have emphasized that federal regulations have not attempted to exercise complete control over a state's electoral institutions through compelled enfranchisement of certain groups within the populace. See Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
The First Circuit, in a decision rendered prior to the direct federal-state confrontation in Pennsylvania v. EPA, recognized that constitutional grants of congressional power vest authority over certain spheres of activity, not over state institutions.
Although it interpreted the Clean Air Amendments to grant the Administrator wide
discretionary power over the control of pollution, the court ruled that the Administrator did not have the power to repeal state laws. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 887-88 (1st Cir. 1973).
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constitutionality. 151 The regulations that command the denial of registration
to noncomplying vehicles, however, should pass constitutional muster.
Although the process of registering vehicles probably qualifies as a traditional governmental function, the imposition of an additional registration
requirement hardly displaces essential state policies. The state has no
valid interest in registering vehicles that do not comply with federal
152
inspection standards.
The EPA regulations, by seeking to displace policy decisions regarding the construction of roadways, the purchase of buses, and the enactment
of legislation substantially intrude into the operation of state governments.
This interference cannot be reconciled with Justice Rehnquist's assertion,
in National League of Cities, that Congress could not supplant state
choices "as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral
governmental functions are to be made.' 153 The only regulations that can
withstand Justice Rehnquist's proposed analysis are those that direct the
denial of registration. The others constitute an unconstitutional burden
on traditional state operations.
National League of Cities indicated that some federal interference
with state operations might be permissible in the event of a national
emergency, and it distinguished Fry on that basis. Thus, if the federal
legislation represented a response to a serious national problem, a court
might balance the federal interest against the state's interest in preserving
151. This aspect of the EPA regulations clearly disrupts the regulatory relationship between states and private motorists. The Court has checked similar extensions of
federal authority in analogous areas. Compare Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (federal legislation that permits
political subdivisions to readjust their debts in federal bankruptcy courts without the
approval of state governments held an unconstitutional extension of the bankruptcy
power) with United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (sustaining revised federal
legislation that required state approval). Both Ashton and Bekins might be read for
the general proposition that federal legislation can neither subvert the regulatory
relationship between states and their subordinates nor subject state resources to federal
regulation. Ashton dismissed an argument based on the commerce power that attempted to justify this federal intrusion. 298 U.S. at 531-32. It observed that the
commerce power did not extend to commercial transactions that did not exert a substantial effect on commerce. Since Ashton, the Court has significantly expanded the
concept of a substantial impact on interstate commerce, reaching even local businesses.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). This does not mean that,
with the modified scope of the substantial-insubstantial distinction, the Ashton Court
would have concluded that the commerce power justified the legislation. Prior to
Ashton, one commentator expressed the concern that the Court's holding in California
would relegate states to the status of persons and completely extinguish the state's
claims for control over their own fiscal affairs. He urged that concerns for state
autonomy should suffice to invalidate federal legislation that was unduly intrusive.
See Note, State Sovereignty as a Limitation Upon the Commerce Power, 45 YALE
L.J. 1118, 1120-21 (1936).
152. For a discussion of the constitutionality of this regulation under the National
League of Cities analysis see note 148 supra.
153. 96 S. Ct.at 2475.

1977]

CLEAN

AIR AMENDMENTS

its autonomy. Because the air pollution crisis arguably constitutes a national
emergency these considerations might be relevant to an evaluation of the
EPA regulations.' 54 Assuming that air pollution, like inflation, can be
considered a national emergency, the issue becomes whether the contribution of the EPA regulations to the alleviation of pollution outweighs the
interest in preventing the erosion of state sovereignty.
Even under this balancing analysis, it is doubtful that the regulations
requiring the purchase of additional buses and the construction of express
bus lanes are constitutional. To the extent that these measures promote
the more efficient use of transportation facilities, they advance the national
interest in reducing air pollution. Nevertheless, their intrusion into state
operations is severe; the regulations would supplant basic state decisions
regarding the formulation of a budget and the selection of construction
projects. 155 Moreover, the federal government can accomplish these objectives through the less intrusive means of financing the projects directly.
In this respect, these regulations are distinguishable from the measures
upheld in Fry where the extension of the wage freeze to state employees
constituted an essential component of the attack on inflation. Furthermore,
the Fry legislation was temporary and, rather than requiring affirmative
action from the states, it merely proscribed any alteration in their wage
structure. Thus, on balance, the federal interests advanced by these regulations do not support the usurpation of such fundamental decisions.
The regulations that direct the adoption and enforcement of inspection
and retrofit programs likewise fail to withstand the scrutiny of the balancing analysis. To the extent that these regulations seek to orchestrate
state legislation and control the regulatory power of the executive branch,
154. Justice Blackmun apparently read the majority opinion to preserve a balancing approach; for he expressly conditioned his participation in the opinion upon that
reading of the case.
I may misinterpret the Court's opinion, but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental
protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state
facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential.

96 S. Ct. at 2476. Given the five to four split on the decision, Justice Blackmun's
advocacy of balancing may be a significant factor in future litigation.

In a recent case involving the application of Title VII age discrimination
requirements to state governments, a federal district court interpreted National League
of Cities to support a balancing analysis. See Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp.
718 (D. Utah 1976). Because the federal interest in nondiscriminatory hiring practices
outweighed any state interest in making age a criterion of employment, the legislation
was sustained. Furthermore, the legislation could be justified as a proper exercise of
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, which expressly operates against
the states. See also Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637

(S.D. Iowa 1976).
155. The substance of these regulations is discussed in notes 33 & 34 and accompaning text supra. The regulations that merely require the identification of express
lanes, note 149 supra, place less strain on state budgets. They might survive the

balancing analysis because they are less intrusive.
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they mark a startling intrusion into the operation of state governments.
Interference with the essence of state sovereignty will not be tolerated
unless it is necessitated by a compelling federal interest. The inspection
and retrofit regulations do not reflect this requisite urgency; the entire
program could be accomplished through direct federal action or through the
simple expedient of requiring states to deny licenses to noncomplying
motorists. Given the availability of less objectionable means to accomplish
the same federal purposes and the importance of the affected state functions,
the balance should be struck in favor of the preservation of state independence.
Thus, the EPA regulations at issue in the four circuit court cases
cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's renewed concern for
federalism and state sovereignty. 15 6 Regardless of which interpretation
of National League of Cities is applied, the regulations cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The only exception to this general condemnation is
the regulation ordering the states to deny registration to vehicles that fail to
comply with federal emissions standards; unlike the other contested regulations, this measure operates as a prohibition rather than a demand for
affirmative action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court considers the varied results reached by
the Ninth, Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits, it will confront
difficult statutory and constitutional issues. In seeking to compel legislative and enforcement measures from the states, the EPA regulations provide the basis for an extraordinary extension of federal control over state
governments. Occasional references in the statutory history of the Clean
Air Amendments lend some support to the claim that the states might be
compelled to establish or adopt and enforce federal programs. But an
examination of the amendments themselves warrants the conclusion that
Congress did not consider this issue. Neither the promulgation nor the
enforcement provisions authorize the Administrator to compel the states
to construct roadways or purchase transit buses. Nor do they contemplate compelling the states to regulate private motorists. Consistent with
156. Although National League of Cities appears to be dispositive of the contested

EPA regulations, that decision leaves some questions unresolved. If Justice Rehnquist's analysis prevails, the focus of future litigation will be on the identification of
"essential policy choices" and "traditional governmental functions." The Court
appears to have adopted an expansive view of traditional governmental functions, but
it has not delineated the extent to which state governments are to be shielded from
federal interference. There are gray areas that remain to be resolved on a case by
case basis, a fact that Justice Rehnquist recognized in his Fry dissent. 421 U.S. at
558 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of National League
of Cities and its implications for the allocation of power between federal and state
governments see Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment, and the Neu,
Federalism,89 H.av. L. Rxv. 1871, 1878-91 (1976).
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the policy of clear statement, the absence of specific statutory language
authorizing the Administrator to compel action by state governments
should allow the Court to avoid the constitutional issues.
If the Court addresses the constitutional issues raised by the EPA
regulations, its deliberations should be guided by the principles of state
sovereignty enunciated in National League of Cities. Considerations of
these issues would provide the Court an opportunity to clarify whether
National League of Cities preserves a balancing analysis for evaluating
the constitutionality of federal commerce legislation or endorses the traditional governmental function approach articulated by Justice Rehnquist.
Under either of the possible readings of National League of Cities, however, the EPA regulations, with a few exceptions, should be declared
unconstitutional.

